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BRIEF OF APPELLANT, TERRY JOHNSON

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Mr. Johnson appeals from a final order of the Third District Court involving the
denial of his motion for a new trial upon conviction. The Utah Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 42.

ISSUES PRESENTED & STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Whether the Court should hear appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel

claims on direct appeal? Standard of Review: Whether the record is adequate to permit
a decision. State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Ct. App. Utah 1993).
2. Whether defense counsel was ineffective under the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution? Standard of Review: Whether defense counsel's
perfonnance was objectively unreasonable, and whether such failures materially
prejudiced Mr. Johnson to the extent that there is a reasonable probability that but for
counsel's errors, the fact finder would have found reasonable doubt as to Mr. Johnson's
culpability for the crime ofmurder. Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
3. Whether prosecutorial misconduct merits reversal? Standard of Review:
Whether the prosecutor's behavior called to the attention of the jurors matters which they
could not properly consider in determining the verdict, and whether Mr. Johnson was
materially prejudiced. State v. Colwell, 994 P .2d 177 (Utah 2000).
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing certain Rule 404(b)
evidence. Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. State v. Gurbransen, 106 P .3d 734,
740 (Utah 2005).
CITATION TO RECORD FOR PRESERVATION OF ISSUES
1. The ineffective assistance of counsel claims are as follows:
(a) defense counsel failed to object to grossly prejudicial use of impermissible
Rule 404(b) evidence. This issue is plain from the record ( R. 615, p. 141, 1. 10-14; R.
617' p. 513, 1. 10).
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(b) defense counsel failed to object to certain material and prejudicial statements
made by him to his ex-spouse under the marital privilege. This issue is plain from the
record ( R. 615, p. 159, I. 9-11).
c) defense counsel failed to object to appellee's misstatement of material facts as
to the time of death for the murder. This issue is plain from the record ( R. 617, p. 488, I.
4-I5).
(d) defense counsel failed to object to appellee's use of inflammatory remarks
during closing argument. The issue is plain from the record ( R. 617, p. 525, I. 12; 527, I.
5; 529, I. 5).
(e) defense counsel failed to elicit effective impeachment from appellee's DNA
expert. The issue is plain from the record ( R. 6I7, p. 435-438; 528, I. I-II).
(f) defense counsel failed to call a DNA expert as a rebuttal witness (Record in its

entirety; Addendum I).
II. Prosecutorial Misconduct Merits Reversal. This is a related issue to the
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and the arguments are is referred to in argument
sections, no. I, 2 and 4 ofthe brief. The issue is plain from the record as stated supra.
III. The Trial Court abused its discretion by allowing certain Rule 404(b) evidence
pertaining to Mr. Johnson's acts of domestic violence, as a foundation for his drug habit.
The issue is plain from the record ( R. 617, p. 575-82, Addendum B).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
The relevant part of the Sixth Amendment to the United Sta1es Constitution reads:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of
counsel for his defence."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 24, 2002, an information was filed against Mr. Terry Johnson for
criminal homicide, a first degree felony. Mr. Johnson was represented by the Salt Lake
Legal Defenders Association. A jury trial was held on June 22-24, 2004. The jury
returned a verdict of guilty on June 24th to homicide murder. On August 10, 2004, Mr.
Johnson was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of five years to life
On August 20, 2004, defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial and to
withdraw. On October 19, 2004, new counsel filed a supplemental motion for new trial,
incorporating ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
On January 25, 2005, the trial court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law
and order, and denied Mr. Johnson's motion for a new trial. Among other things, the
conclusions oflaw stated that: (1) the evidence adduced at trial which indicated that Mr.
Johnson had choked his wife with a belt and had tried to abort her fetus by punching her
in the stomach was not overly prejudicial under Rule 403, but was relevant under Rule
404(b), as a foundation for introducing evidence pertaining to Mr. Johnson's drug habit;
(2) the prosecutor did not act improperly; and, (3) defense counsel was not ineffective.
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On February 16, 2005, Mr. Johnson filed a notice of appeal. On March 14, 2005, the
Supreme Court assigned this case to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Rule 42.
On December 6, 2005, under present counsel, Mr. Johnson filed a Motion to
Remand for Findings Necessary for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim, pursuant to
Utah R. App. P. 23B. Mr. Johnson raised new theories for ineffectiveness and
prosecutorial misconduct in this motion, and submitted affidavits by the DNA expert used
by defense counsel and appellee's forensic pathologist.
On February 8, 2006, this Court denied appellant's motion in part, because: "the
few additional facts referenced in appellant's exhibits have no connection whatsoever to
the arguments regarding ineffective assistance set forth in appellant's memorandum."
On February 27, 2006, appellant filed an amended motion to renew remand for
findings necessary for ineffective assistance of counsel claim. On May 11, 2006, this
Court denied appellant's motion.

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED
On December 30, 1993, a fourteen year old boy by the name of Christopher Mosier
was found stabbed to death by 35 stab wounds in his apartment by his mother, Sylvia
Mosier ( R. 615, p. 80, 96). There were no eye witnesses to the murder (Record in its
entirety). There was no murder weapon found (Record in its entirety). There was no
evidence found on Mr. Johnson's body or clothing, even though he was interviewed by
the police shortly after the murder took place ( R. 615, p. 15 2-15 3) (and despite the fact
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that the murder involved a great deal of blood loss by multiple stab wounds). The
testimony of the victim's mother was that Mr. Johnson had a good relationship with her
son, and that he had no motive to kill him ( R. 615, p. 113, 1. 6-25). Thus, appellee's
theory for motive, i.e., that Mr. Johnson, being a drug addict, needed to kill the boy so
that he could steal something from the apartment to get money to buy drugs seems far
fetched, especially in light of the fact that Mr. Johnson was employed at the time ( R. 617,
p. 520; I. 7-17).
The boy's mother testified that: (1) Chris carried a knife, because he was afraid of
gangs ( R. 615, p. 122,1. 4, 12); (2) he collected knives; and, (3) was stopped by the
police for carrying knives ( R. 615, p. 122). Chris used to participate in mock knife fights
with his friend Brandon Bray ( R. 617, p. 461 ). Mr. Bray had taken classes in how to
fight with a knife ( R. 617, p. 460), and was a martial arts instructor ( R. 617, p. 460).
Thus, there was evidence that someone else in this gang infested neighborhood might
have killed the boy.
Mr. Bray told detectives that: (1) Chris was an expert knife fighter ( R. 617, p.
462-63); (2) Chris carried two knives and a billy club ( R. 617, p. 463); (3) Chris carried
an 11" kitchen knife ( R. 617, p. 464 ); (4) Chris was strong for his age ( R. 617, p. 462);
and, (5) it would have been difficult for somebody of average weight and build to
overpower Chris ( R. 617, p. 464). Mr. Bray also testified that: (1) Chris carried a knife
because he was afraid of gangs ( R. 617, p. 464, 1. 5); and, (2) he thought that gangs had
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killed Chris ( R. 617, p. 473,1.6).
Around the time the boy was killed, Mr. Johnson went to visit a friend of his by the
name ofMagdy Hassan ( R. 615, p. 160). Messrs. Hassan and Johnson consumed alcohol
and crack that night ( R.615, pp. 172-73, 181-82). Mr. Johnson's demeanor was "quite
normal and happy" on the night of the murder ( R. 615, pp. 166, l. 15-16; 152, l. 14-21).
Mr. Johnson used the bathroom while visiting Mr. Hassan ( R. 615, p. 167). Mr. Hassan
saw no blood on Mr. Johnson when he came to his house ( R. 615, p. 181, l. 11). Later
that evening, Mr. Johnson called his ex-wife to let her know that he was too drunk to
drive ( R. 615, p. 131, l. 12). Upon his ex-wife picking him up, the police immediately
took Mr. Johnson to the Kearns station to interview him about the killing ( R. 615, p. 152,
1.25; 153,1.1-7).
Trial counsel never cross examined any of the several police witnesses about
whether they discovered wounds to Mr. Johnson's body, after he had allegedly: (1)
stabbed the decedent 35 times with a knife ( R. 616, p. 239,1. 9); and, (2) may have
received blows from the decedent through kicks with his boots ( R. 616, p. 323,1. 1-13).
Before trial, appellee provided written notice, that it intended to introduce certain
Rule 404(b) evidence at trial ( R. 616, p. 227-234). The evidence consisted oftestimony
from Mr. Johnson's ex wife, Linda Johnson, that Mr. Johnson: (1) had a drug habit; and
(2) had stolen money and property to support his habit ( R. 616, p. 230).
Appellee further indicated that it would introduce certain statements made by Mr.
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Johnson, pursuant to either Rule 404(b) or 801(d)(2)(A). Those statements were that Mr.
Johnson believed that male, teenage babysitters abused children ( R. 616, p. 228). Mr.
Johnson's attorneys filed no written objections to the introduction of this evidence.
On June 17, 2004, a hearing was held concerning this Rule 404(b) evidence. The
Court ruled that: (1) appellee would have to lay a foundation for the theft evidence ( R.
615, p. 18,1. 16); and, (2) it could introduce evidence ofMr. Johnson's drug use ( R. 615,
p .. 20,1. 22). The Court then signed a findings of fact and conclusion oflaw which
indicated that: ( 1) the appellee's evidence was necessary to prove intent, plan and motive
for the crime; (2) Mr. Johnson drug activities was not overly prejudicial; and, (3)
appellee's proposed 404(b) evidence was admissible, subject to laying a foundation ( R.
616, p. 277-278).
However, during trial, appellee suddenly introduced additional and incredibly
damaging 404(b) evidence, for which it had not provided prior notke. That is, it
introduced evidence through Mrs. Johnson that Mr. Johnson had: (1) pushed her; and, (2)
put a belt around her throat when she was pregnant, and had wanted to kill her and her
fetus (R. 615, p. 141,1. 10-14). Mr. Johnson's attorneys failed to: (1) object to the
introduction of this evidence; (2) move to strike the evidence with a cautionary jury
instruction to disregard the evidence; and/or, (3) move for a mistrial. Appellee never
offered a theory as to why this evidence, although incredibly prejudicial, was relevant,
pursuant to Rule 404(b ), or how it was foundational to Mr. Johnson''s drug habit. It also
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failed to show why notice should be waived for good cause, in conformity with the rules
of evidence.
Post-conviction, Mr. Johnson's second lawyer moved for a new trial, based on
ineffective assistance of counsel as to the 404(b) evidence. The trial court, in denying
this motion, held that: "Specific incidents of domestic violence were elicited as
foundation for defendant's statements [as to his drug habit]. These incidences also
explained defendant's ex-wife's reluctance to initially reveal information against the
defendant" (R. 575-582) (Addendum B).
Appellee also elicited unannounced testimony from Mrs. Johnson that Mr. Johnson
had made the following statements to her: (1) Mr. Johnson had other people killed for
saying certain things that she had said to him ( R. 615, p. 142, 1. 13); (2) he could put his
fist through the back ofher head ( R. 615, p. 142,1. 15); and, (3) while commenting on
the O.J. Simpson trial, that Mr. Johnson was able to kill somebody without getting caught
( R. 615, p. 142,1. 20-23). None of these statements were objected to by Mr. Johnson's
trial counsel, pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 502, i.e., the marital communications privilege.
An important theory of the appellee's was that Mr. Johnson had an opportunity to
do the crime. It posited the theory that there was only about a 5-l 0 minute opportunity
for someone to do the crime ( R. 617, p. 518, I. 19). However, its argument grossly
misrepresented the facts, because the window of opportunity was actually two hours. Not
only that, but Mr. Johnson's attorney, didn't catch appellee's error, and actually agreed
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with its time line theory ( R. 617, p. 487-88 ). In reality, the boy's mother testified that
she did not get home until around 9:30P.M. ( R. 615, p .. 94, 1. 23).
The Legal Defenders never cross examined any witness, e.g., Dr. Leiss, concerning
the likelihood that even assuming Mr. Johnson had changed his clothes and washed
himself in Mr. Hassan's bathroom, that he would still have had cuts to his hand after he
had stabbed a struggling, martial arts trained, knife using, strong for his age victim 35
times, or that specks of blood would have been found on his clothing and/or body (Record
in its entirety).
During the cross examination of the appellee's DNA expert, John Gabriel Bier, Mr.
Johnson's lawyer failed to adduce a clear understanding of the problems with the expert's
methodology and results. Indeed, the Court repeatedly admonished defense counsel to
make a better record of what it was he was trying to accomplish through cross
examination ( R. 617, pp. 438,1. 13-15; 439,1. 18-20; 440,1. 11-17, 19-20). More
specifically, defense counsel: (1) failed to elicit from Mr. Beir by testimony as to why
failure to obtain a substrate control was material (R. 617, pp. 434-442); (2) actually
elicited from Mr. Beir that his lack of using a substrate control was immaterial, because
another company, i.e., Seri, had used a substrate control (R. 617, p. 436, 1. 2-4); (3)
elicited testimony that the odds that Seri's DNA research was wrong was 294,000 to 1 (R.
617, p. 435, 1. 24); and, (4) elicited testimony from Mr. Beir that use of a substrate
control was irrelevant (R. 617, p. 438, 1. 15-18). Then, during closing argument, defense
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counsel never objected to appellee calling Mr. Beir's testimony definitive proof that it had
matched Mr. Johnson's blood on his baby's blanket by DNA evidence (R. 617, p. 528, 1.
11).

Dr. Elizabeth Johnson, the DNA expert who trial counsel had consulted for trial
states (by affidavit in Mr. Johnson's Rule 23B motions) that the cross examination failed
to elicit a clear understanding of a variety of concepts (Addendum A). That is, her
affidavit states that the following subjects were not adequately explained to the jury, and
could have negatively affected Mr. Johnson's case: (1) no blood was found on the
clothing or shoes of Mr. Johnson (an unlikely event); (2) the blood stains found on the
baby blanket could have been there before the murder; (3) since the victim had handled
the baby blanket on the day of the murder, it would not have been unlikely for his DNA to
be on the blanket; (4) the DNA sample could have been contaminated; (5) and the DNA
testing methodology could not be attributed to a blood stain, because a substrate control
had not been tested.
Appellee introduced evidence at trial that a certain baby blanket belonging to Mr.
Johnson's baby had the victim's DNA on it. Indeed, appellee twice called the DNA test a
match for the victim's blood during closing argument ( R. 617, pp. 416, 1. 12-16;
528,1.4-14). However, the affidavit by Dr. Johnson indicates that the State's
representations were incorrect. Defense counsel did not object to these arguments as
well.

II

In closing argument, the prosecutor repeatedly, explicitly and implicitly called Mr.
Johnson a liar. She did so 12 times ( R. 617, pp. 513,1.6-12; Tr. 525,1. 12-17; Tr.
525,1.23-25; Tr. 526, 1. 1-7; Tr. 526; Tr. 527,1. 5; Tr. 529,1. 5). She also implied that
Mr. Johnson had obstructed justice twice ( R. 617, pp. 524,1. 17-20; Tr. 525, 1. 17-22).
Mr. Johnson's attorneys never objected to these prejudicial and inflammatory arguments.
The prosecutor also referred to the undisclosed 404(b) evidence during her closing
argument ( R. 617, p. 513,1. 10-11).
However, Mrs. Johnson also testified that at the time of the murder: (1) she was
not afraid ofMr. Johnson ( R. 615, p. 147,1. 11-15) (thus repudiating one ofthe court's
reasons for the relevance of the domestic violence evidence); (2) she thought that Mr.
Johnson had no involvement with the murder ( R. 615, p. 147,1. 16-18); (3) she could not
picture Mr. Johnson killing anyone (R. 615, p. 147,1. 19-20); (4) Mr. Johnson
immediately returned from Mr. Hassan's home, upon learning that the police wanted to
talk with him ( R. 615, p. 149, 1. 9-21); and, (5) on the night of the murder, Mr. Johnson's
demeanor was calm ( R. 615. 152,1. 14-24).
In its denial of Mr. Johnson's 23B motion for an evidentiary hearing, to obtain,
among other things, the testimony of Dr. Johnson, this Court held that the facts pertaining
to Dr. Johnson's affidavit had "no connection whatsoever to the arguments regarding
ineffective assistance."
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This African-American male was not given a fair trial pursuant to the mandates of
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defense counsels' gross
ineffectiveness and the prosecutor's egregious misconduct skewed the outcome of the
trial so badly, that one cannot say with any degree of reasonable certainty, that but for
these material errors, the jury would not have found reasonable doubt for the crime
charged. Indeed, appellee alleges that Mr. Johnson, who was too drunk too drive home
the evening of the murder, and who spoke to the police shortly after the murder, would
have had the presence of mind to wipe from his body and clothes all specks of blood in a
friend's bathroom (while consuming alcohol and drugs with the friend), and after killing a
knife trained teenager by 35 stab wounds.
ARGUMENT

I. THE INEFFECTIVE CLAIMS SHOULD BE BROUGHT
ON DIRECT APPEAL.
In State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah 1993), the Supreme Court held that a
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel may be brought on direct appeal if: ( 1) the
record is adequate to permit such a decision; and, (2) the defendant is represented by new
counsel.
In this instance, appellant is represented by new counsel. Additionally, this Court
in denying both of appellant's Rule 23B motions, twice cited to State v. Johnston, 13 P.3d
175 (2000) for the proposition that "a remand is not necessary if the facts underlying the
13

ineffectiveness claim are contained in the existing record." The only reasonable inference
to be drawn from this language is that this Court believes that appellant has articulated
sufficient facts in his Rule 23B motions to make out a prima facie claim of
ineffectiveness. Consequently, it would appear that under the authorities cited, an
ineffective claim is permissible on direct appeal.
Secondly, appellee appears to have waived any objection to hearing an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal. Indeed, appellee in its response in
opposition to defendant's Rule 23B motion to remand for an evidentiary hearing,
repeatedly argued that no such hearing was warranted, because the record was sufficient
to address appellant's ineffectiveness claims. Thus, it follows, that if a party's failure to
object to an issue before the court constitutes waiver, e.g., Balderas v. Starks,- P.3d -,
2006 WL 1422568, 2006 UT App 218 (2006), a fortiori, when the party actually argues
for the proposition, it also constitutes waiver, if the party decides to take a materially
inconsistent position later on.
Thirdly, this Court in denying Mr. Johnson's request for an evidentiary hearing to
augment the record pertaining to Dr. Johnson's affidavit, stated that the need for a hearing
was unnecessary, because the facts contained in Dr. Johnson's affidavit had "no
connection whatsoever" to Mr. Johnson's ineffectiveness claims. :tvfr. Johnson is in
prison and indigent. Thus, it follows that since this Court has denied Mr. Johnson an
evidentiary hearing at this time (because the facts are sufficient on the record to proceed),
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it would be logically inconsistent and prejudicial to Mr. Johnson for the Court to now say
that he must allege his ineffectiveness claims as to Dr. Johnson through a habeas
proceeding (with its attendant evidentiary hearing procedure), so that it may take
testimony from Dr. Johnson as to her perspectives on the DNA evidence. Indeed, it
would seem that since Dr. Johnson's affidavit it part of this proceeding, it should be
considered as a basis for Mr. Johnson's ineffectiveness claims, on motion by this Court
sua sponte.
II. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE.
1. Failure to Object to Grossly Prejudicial Evidence
The legal standard to determine whether trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a
defendant must show that: ( 1) trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness; and, (2) but for these errors, there was a reasonable probability that the
fact finder would have found reasonable doubt for the crime charged. !d. at 687-88. The
overarching concern is not that trial counsel did some things well, or that he had a good,
overall background in criminal law; rather, it is whether trial counsel's errors were such,
that a truly adversarial process never took place, rendering the verdict questionable. !d.
Unbelievably, the attorney's from the Legal Defenders, Mr. Johnson's lawyers
failed to object to the undisclosed 404(b) evidence pertaining to his alleged choking and
assaultive behaviors against his ex-wife, and the attempted murder of her fetus. The latter
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crime is murder in Utah. State v. MacGuire, 84 P.3d 1171, 2004 UT 4, P 5 (2004), citing,
U.C.A. S 76-5-201(1). The nature ofthe attempted murder of a fetus is of course nearly
identical to the behavior associated with the charge here. Hence, there was an inherently
grave danger that the jury would have inferred that Mr. Johnson had acted in conformity
with his alleged, past violent behavior, let alone engendering its hostility. Thus, this
evidence should have been reasonably objected to under Utah R. Evid. 403 and 404(b).

State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239 (Utah 1992). Indeed, evidence that a defendant had
previously struck his wife is not admissible in a homicide prosecution to prove that
defendant acted in conformity with his basic character for violence under Rule 404(b ).
/d.

Additionally, pursuant to Rule 404(b ), appellee was required to give prior notice of
its intent to use such evidence, ostensibly to provide a defendant's counsel with adequate
time to mitigate or rebut such evidence, and to avoid undue surprise. Hence, it was
incumbent upon Mr. Johnson's lawyers to object to the appellee's use of the evidence.
In light of these facts, it was grossly unreasonable for Mr. Johnson's lawyers not to
have: ( 1) objected to the use of this evidence; (2) requested a limiting instruction as to the
relevance of such evidence, e.g., to prove Mr. Johnson's intent, but not to show that he
acted in conformity with past behavior, etc.; and/or, (3) to have moved for a mistrial. See

Mackey v. Russell, 148 Fed. Appx. 355 (6th Cir. 2005).
Indeed, the situation here is egregious in comparison to counsel's performance in
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Mackey. In Mackey, counsel actually had made periodic and non-specific objections to
404(b) evidence that was used primarily for impeachment evidence. But here, no
objections were made at all, and it is obvious from the record that appellee was using the
evidence to prove that appellant was acting in conformity with his violent character.
Moreover, even though there was a limiting instruction given pertaining to Mr.
Johnson's alleged theft and drug activities, there never was any discussion between the
parties and the Court (let alone a limiting instruction) as to whether Mr. Johnson's alleged
belt choking and attempted murder of a fetus was unduly prejudicial. Thus, counsel's
deficiencies here are far worse than those found by the Sixth Circuit in Mackey. To
determine prejudice, this Court must assess the impact of counsel's errors collectively.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696-96.
Obviously the evidence was prejudicial by portraying the character of Mr. Johnson
as a violent person. The danger of such evidence was that the jury might infer that he
acted in conformity with his alleged, past behavior. Prejudice must be presumed in
conformity with the legislative mandate of Rule 404(b ). Moreover, since this was a
purely circumstantial case, i.e., there was no direct evidence that Mr. Johnson had
committed the crime, this error could have very easily effected the outcome of the trial

(See discussion of prejudice in part IV of brief). The situation is grossly different from
that in Hamilton, where the overall strength of the prosecution's case was high.

Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240.
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2. Failure to Assert the Marital Privilege
Pursuant to Rule 502(b)(2) of Utah's Rules ofEvidence, marital communications
are privileged, and Mr. Johnson had the right to preclude the appellee's use of statements
made to his wife during the course of their marriage. State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219
(Utah 1997). Defense counsel also failed to object under Utah R. Evid. 404(b) to the
undisclosed and incredibly damaging statements allegedly made by Mr. Johnson to his
wife during the course of their marriage. Those statements were that Mr. Johnson: (1)
had other people killed for saying certain things that his wife had said to him; (2) could
put his fist through the back of his wife's head; (3) while commenting on the O.J.
Simpson trial, stated to his wife that he could also get away with murder; and, (4) had told
his wife that he would kill their baby in front of her just to make her suffer ( R. 615, p.
159: 9-11). Such suppositions (even if true) can hardly be viewed as anything but
unbridled musings, rather than declarations of intent to commit a crime. That is, the
statements did not involve a crime committed against Mrs. Johnson, or anyone else in the
home. Indeed, the statements could hardly be construed as harassment (U.C.A. S
76-5-106) or assault (U.C.A. S 76-5-102), because mere statements about hypothetical
violence are not crimes in Utah, unless associated with a simultaneous show of force, or if
they are in writing. Consequently, use of these statements at trial were objectionable
under the marital communication evidentiary rule, and there probative value was
questionable. The statements were thus inherently prejudicial for the reasons stated
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supra.
3. Failure to Object to Appellee's Misrepresentation of Material Facts
If a prosecutor suggests unreasonable inferences or misstates the facts in closing
argument, defense counsel's failure to object is unreasonable, unless part of a viable trial
strategy. See State v. Lord, 128 Wash.App. 216, 114 P.3d 1241 (2005). In this instance,
one of the material facts appellee needed to prove was the opportunity for Mr. Johnson to
commit the crime. The evidence at trial was that there was a window of at least two hours
when the murder could have occurred. That is, Chris's grandmother had spoken to him at
7:30P.M., and Ms. Mosier did not discovery her dead son until around 9:30P.M. Thus,
it was patently unreasonable for Mr. Johnson's attorneys not to argue against the
appellee's representation to the jury, that the murder occurred between 7:40 to 7:50P.M.
( R. 617, p. 519,1. 15-16).
Indeed, as here, where defense counsel in essence corroborated the appellee's
theory by materially misstating Ms. Mossier's time for discovering the body during
closing argument, i.e., around 8:00P.M., rather than around 9:30P.M., and assumed
arguendo, that appellee's time line for the murder was correct ( R., 617, p. 488, 1. 4-15),
the error cannot be viewed as anything but negligence, and materially unreasonable ( R.
617, p. 487, 1. 11; R. 615, p. 94, 1. 10-24 ). In conjunction with the other material errors
stated, its effect was cumulative, and the prejudice must be inferred as material, given the
circumstantial nature ofthe case. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993).
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4. Failure to Object to Inflammatory Remarks During
Closing Argument.
Inflammatory remarks made during closing argument by the prosecutor may
warrant reversal. The test is: (1) did the remarks draw the jury's attention to matters that
they were not justified in hearing; and, (2) were the jury probably influenced by the
remarks. State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973). Generallly a prosecutor may not
create evidence through arguments or statements of personal belief. Mott v. Iowa, 695
N.W.2d 43 (2004). References to defense witnesses as a pack ofliars had been
condemned as plainly out of bounds. State v. Rutledge, 600 N.W.2d 324, 325 (Iowa
1999). It is also improper for a prosecutor to call the defendant a liar, or to state that the
defendant is a liar. State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 869 (Iowa 2003). Where as here
the prosecutor called Mr. Johnson a liar 12 times ( R. 615, pp. 525, I. 12; 527, I. 5; 529, I.
5), it is reasonable to infer that the prosecutor's statements impermissibly inflamed the
jury, and in light of the circumstantial nature of the State's evidence, could have impacted
the verdict. Thus, appellee's use of the liar statements was inherently prejudicial, and
defense counsel's failure to object was objectively unreasonable.
5. Failure to Effectively Cross-Examine Appellee's
DNA Expert.
During the cross examination of the appellee's DNA expert, John Gabriel Bier, Mr.
Johnson's lawyer failed to adduce a clear understanding of the problems with the expert's
methodology and results. Indeed, the Court repeatedly admonished defense counsel to
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make a better record of what it was he was trying to accomplish through cross
examination(R.617,pp.438,1.13-15;439,1.18-20;440,1.11-17, 19-20). More
specifically, defense counsel: (1) failed to elicit from Mr. Beir by cross examination why
failure to utilize a substrate control was material ( R. 617, p. 434-442); (2) actually
elicited from Mr. Beir that his failure to use a substrate control was immaterial, because
another company, i.e., Seri, had used a substrate control to conduct its testing ( R. 617, p.
436, I. 2-4); (3) elicited testimony that the odds that Seri's DNA research was wrong was
294,000 to 1 ( R. 617, p. 435, 1. 24); and, (4) elicited testimony from Mr. Beir that use of
a substrate control is irrelevant ( R. 617, p. 438, 1. 15-18). Then, during closing argument,
defense counsel never objected to appellee calling Mr. Beir's testimony definitive proof
that it had matched Mr. Johnson's blood on his baby's blanket by DNA evidence ( R. 617,
p. 528, I. 11).
In its response in opposition to defendant's motion to renew 23B motion to remand
for an evidentiary hearing, appellee argued that the evidence before the jury was that: ( 1)
appellee's DNA expert did not use a substrate control; (2) the jury knew that appellee's
match of blood samples between Mr. Johnson and the decedent's blood on the former's
baby's blanket was questionable because of that; and, (3) that defense counsel (by
implication) had adequately impeached the DNA expert on this point.
Yet the facts do not imply these conclusions. That is, appellee's DNA expert, Mr.
Beir testified that the victim's sample of blood matched the stain that he had taken from
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the blanket. ( R. 617, p. 416, I. 12-14). Appellee also elicited testimony from Mr. Beir
that the statistical probability that Mr. Johnson's blood was found on his baby's blanket as
3.8 million to 1 ( R. 617, p. 417, I. 3). Consequently, it is wrong to infer that defense
counsel's arguments provided sufficient impeachment of Mr. Beir.
Finally, defense counsel only argued during his closing argument, the flaws
associated with Mr. Beir's testimony, rather than using a DNA expert in rebuttal ( R.
617, p. 492, I. 15). Thus, defense counsel's statements were not evidence, and there was
no basis for the jury to believe anything that defense counsel argued at closing on this
subject. Thus, it is reasonable to infer prejudice.
6. Failure to Call a DNA Expert Witness was Ineffective.
In Utah, whether defense counsel is ineffective for not calling an expert witness to
testify at trial is viewed from the perspective of whether such a decision is a reasonable
tactical decision. See Fedorowicz v. State, 2005 WL 231927 (Utah App.) 2005 UT App
405 (2006). Such a decision is only reasonable, if upon consultation with an expert,
effective cross examination is performed, e.g., material impeachme·nt evidence is elicited.
Jones v. Suthers, 130 Fed. Appx. 235, 242 (101h Cir. 2005).
In contrast to Fedorowicz, defense counsel in this instance used an expert witness
to assist him with his cross examination preparation of appellee's expert witness. The
apparent trial tactic of defense counsel was to get appellee's witness to admit on the stand
that his DNA testing was flawed (based on defense counsel's prior discussions with Dr.
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Johnson), thus rendering Mr. Beir's testimony inconclusive. But this did not happen.
Rather, Mr. Beir testified that his failure to use a substrate control was immaterial to his
scientific opinion, and that the DNA on Mr. Johnson's baby's blanket was the victim's
( R. 617, p. 438, l. 15-18). That such testimony would occur was a reasonable possibility,
which defense counsel should have anticipated. Thus, it was incumbent upon defense
counsel to anticipate this problem, and have Dr. Johnson available to impeach the
credibility of Mr. Beir as a rebuttal witness. See State v. Richard A.P., 223 Wis.2d 777,
792; 589 N.W.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1998); Hicks v. State, 443 S.E.2d 907,908 (S.C. 1994).
That such testimony was readily available is obvious. Dr. Johnson's affidavit
states that: "a DNA profile cannot be absolutely attributed to a bloodstain if a substrate
control is not tested." Her qualifications for exceed that of Mr. Beir. Dr. Johnson's
affidavit also points out that: ( 1) the relevance of the lightness of the bloodstains on the
baby blanket as well as the lack of blood on the defendant's clothing was not adequately
explained, because: (a) if Mr. Johnson had murdered Mr. Mosier, he should have had a lot
ofblood on his body and clothing; and, (b) Mr. Mossier's blood stain could have been on
the blanket previously (supported by the fact that Mr. Mossier liked the baby, picked up
the baby, and had access to the baby regularly and for several weeks prior to the murder);
and, (2) it is not unusual to find a small amount of a the victim's blood on a random
object, and that DNA testing does not reveal how or when a stain was deposited. Since
defense counsel did not elicit any of these admissions from Mr. Beir, his use of an expert
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witness was ineffective under Fedorowicz.
Indeed, instead of utilizing Dr. Johnson as a rebuttal expert, defense counsel used
the information garnered from Dr. Johnson to argue her unsupported assertions during his
closing argument. This clearly was unreasonable, as defense counsel was not an expert,
and the jury never heard any of the available evidence to impeach Mr. Beir's assertions
from Dr. Johnson directly. Indeed, it is not speculative to infer tha1t Dr. Johnson's
testimony would have been irrelevant, because her readily available testimony could have
created doubt in the minds of the jurors as to the materiality of Mr. Beir's testimony.
Thus, it is reasonable to infer prejudice on this point as well.
III. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT MERITS REVERSAL.
Whether prosecutorial misconduct merits reversal is based upon the following
factors: ( 1) whether the behavior drew attention to matters which were not properly
before the jury; and, (2) whether the defendant suffered prejudice. See State v. Colwell,
994 P.2d 177 (Utah 2000). Mr. Johnson incorporates by reference the arguments he has
made in part II., sections 1, 2 and 4 of this brief for this issue. In these sections, it is clear
that the prosecutor impermissibly used 404(b) evidence and slandered Mr. Johnson
repeatedly during her closing argument. Based upon these arguments, he concludes that
the prosecutor did impermissibly draw attention to these issues, and that it is reasonable to
infer that Mr. Johnson suffered prejudice by the prosecutor's actions.
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IV. APPELLEE'S CASE WAS WEAK, AND PREJUDICE RESULTED.
1. General Considerations
An appellate court should overturn a conviction under either an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim or a prosecutorial misconduct claim, when the conviction is
not strongly supported by the record, and the errors materially contributed to the unjust
verdict. See State v. Templin, 805 P .2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990). Under the authorities
cited, Mr. Johnson makes cogent arguments as to why there was ineffectiveness and
prosecutorial misconduct. For the following reasons, Mr. Johnson also contends, that
because of these errors, there is also reasonable doubt as to whether the jury verdict is
correct.
In this instance, Mr. Johnson was only found guilty of murder by circumstantial
evidence. The prosecution took place approximately 10 years after the murder had
occurred. Thus, there was an inherent danger that the witnesses memories had faded by
the time of trial.
There was no eye witness to the crime, there was no murder weapon found and
there was no cogent motive presented. Indeed, the testimony of the decedent's mother,
i.e., the most potentially hostile witness in appellee's case, was that Chris and Mr.
Johnson got along well.
Additionally, during the ten year hiatus from murder to prosecution, Mr. Johnson
never admitted that he had killed the boy. This seems odd, in light of the evidence that
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Mr. Johnson apparently had no problem in presenting himself in a bad light on a variety
of occasions.
2. The DNA Evidence was Seriously Flawed and Misused.
Appellee introduced evidence from a non-Ph.D., DNA expert. His testimony was
that the decedent's blood was on Mr. Johnson's baby's blanket. However, this evidence
was not cogent. Indeed, the DNA expert used by defense counsel in preparation for trial,
i.e., Dr. Johnson, stated that in light of defense counsel's failure to cross-examine Mr.
Bear adequately, the outcome of Mr. Johnson's trial could have been negatively affected.
Indeed, Dr. Johnson's concerns were that: (1) there was a lack of blood on Mr.
Johnson's clothing; (2) it would not have been unusual to find the decedent's DNA on the
baby's blanket (because the decedent had daily contact with the baby (including holding
the baby)); and, (3) failure to perform a substrate control meant that it was impossible to
determine whether the blood was from the decedent, or whether his saliva or some other
source was superimposed over the blood (thus giving a false positive). Dr. Johnson was
available to provide this cogent rebuttal evidence.
Yet the prosecutor during closing argument repeatedly called the DNA evidence a
match. Appellee in its response to Mr. Johnson's renewed Rule 23B motion states that

Mr. Beir did not absolutely state that there was a match. Although this may be true, Mr.
Beir did provide astronomical probabilists that the blood samples were a match. But
more importantly, the prosecutor called it a match- repeatedly. Thus, the prosecutor's
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unimpeached mischaracterization could have persuaded the jury to convict an innocent
man.
Additionally, and as Dr. Johnson suggests, the fact that there was no blood found
on Mr. Johnson's body or clothing is highly material. The decedent died of35 stab
wounds. There was evidence of a struggle. Mr. Johnson met with police shortly after the
boy had been killed. Prior to meeting with the police, Mr. Johnson was so intoxicated,
that he had called his ex-wife to give him a ride home. To think that Mr. Johnson in this
highly intoxicated condition would have had the presence of mind and ability to clean
every speck of blood off his body and clothes (even ifhe had the opportunity to use his
friend's bathroom for a few minutes to do so) and be able to hide this evidence from
trained homicide detectives shortly after the murder, is highly improbable. These facts in
and of themselves indicates extreme doubt that the verdict is correct.
3. The Character Evidence was Highly Prejudicial.
The prosecutor impermissibly introduced very damaging character evidence that
Mr. Johnson was a wife beater and a baby killer. She also repeatedly called him a liar
during closing argument. The Legal Defenders did not object to any of these highly
inflammatory remarks. It is an ancient rule of evidence that one cannot use prior bad acts
to prove that a person acted in conformity with his character. The policy associated with
this rule is that society does not want innocent persons in prison as a result of prior and
irrelevant behavior. This evidence in and of itself may have caused a bad conviction, and
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was highly prejudicial
4. The Other Evidence was not Compelling.
The rest of appellee's evidence was less than compelling. As noted, appellee's
time line theory was highly flawed, because Mr. Johnson's window of opportunity to kill
the decedent was two hours, rather than 5 minutes (as represented by the prosecutor
during closing argument).
The evidence about a missing kitchen knife from Mr. Johnson's house was not
overly material. Indeed, Mr. Johnson's ex-wife testified that she never spoke to Mr.
Johnson about the knife ( R. 615, p. 141, l. 4-5), and that dust had accumulated in the
block where the knife had been placed ( R. 615, p. 140, l. 1-6). Thus, it is reasonable to
infer that the knife had been missing long before the murder had ev,er taken place. It
would also have been reasonable to infer that there could have been any number of
plausible explanations for why the knife had been missing from the kitchen around the
time of the murder (especially in light of the fact that the testimony occurred nearly 10
years after the incident).
Additionally, appellee's theory for the murder was that Mr. Johnson killed the boy,
because he was a drug addict, and had wanted to steal something to pawn for his drug
use. Although it is inherently far fetched to think that a drug user would kill someone to
get high, the facts here, also belie such a conclusion. For example, if Mr. Johnson had
killed the boy, and had picked up the baby in the process, presumably the baby would
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have been traumatized, and would have had blood on himself and his clothing. Neither
occurred, according to the testimony of Mr. Hassan, i.e., the baby was not crying when
Mr. Johnson entered Mr. Hassan's home ( R. 615, p. 182, 1. 4; p. 181, 1. 10-11).
Additionally, Mr. Johnson was employed, and actually had left from work on the
night of the murder before picking up the baby. Thus, it seems unreasonable to infer that
Mr. Johnson needed to kill the boy simply to get money to get high, because he should
have had money in his pocket from his wages.
Lastly, appellee called as a witness a convicted felon for a crime involving
dishonesty, i.e., receiving stolen property, ( R. 616, p. 344). The witness's name was
Matthew Alan Rushton. In 2002, he was apparently a cell mate of Mr. Johnson's. Thus,
it can hardly be said that the statements made by Mr. Rushton were persuasive of Mr.
Johnson's guilt.
Consequently, based upon the other material facts presented by appellee, it can
hardly be said that it presented a compelling case against the accused. Thus, the cited
errors are material, and may have easily skewed the outcome of the trial.
V. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
REGARDING THE 404(B) EVIDENCE.
Whether a trial court errs in permitting the jury to hear overly prejudicial evidence
is viewed from the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Gurbransen, 106 P .3d 734, 740
(Utah 2005). In this instance, the trial court held that the prosecution's use of the
undisclosed domestic violence evidence was relevant, i.e., the choking of his ex-wife with
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a belt, and the attempted murder of a fetus, to lay a foundation for Mr. Johnson's drug
habit, and to show that Mr. Johnson's ex-wife was reluctant to disclose information
against him. This ruling was an abuse of discretion for four reasons.
First, Utah R. Evid. 404(b) requires notice of intention to use such evidence prior
to trial. This issue was never addressed by the Trial Court in its ruling. The notice
requirement is undoubtedly there to prevent undue surprise, and insure a fair trial,
especially for serious cases such as this one. Thus, prejudice should be presumed when a
prosecutor springs such materially harmful evidence during the course of trial, given the
legislative mandate for such notice
Secondly, Rule 404(b) evidence can only be used for very specific non-character
purposes, i.e., to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident. There is no articulated purpose by the legislature to
use such evidence either for: (1) laying a foundation for other 404(b) evidence; or, (2) to
show a witness's reluctance to disclose information about a defendant. Indeed, in light of
the great danger in having a jury believe that a defendant acted in conformity with his
past behavior, the legislature has limited the use of Rule 404(b) evidence in a very narrow
way.
Thirdly, a court must conduct Rule 403 balancing before allowing Rule 404(b)
evidence. State v. Kirkwood, 47 P.3d Ill (Utah App. 2002). The lower court not only
failed to articulate a reason for allowing the evidence under Rule 403, it allowed appellee
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to use Rule 404(b) evidence for an impermissible purpose, e.g., to establish foundation
for Mr. Johnson's drug habit Such was an abuse of discretion, and inherently prejudicial
for the reasons stated above.
Fourth, Mr. Johnson's ex-wife testified that she was not afraid of him, and that she
believed he did not kill the boy. Thus, the reasoning of the Court for allowing the
evidence, i.e., to show the ex-wife's reluctance to say something bad about Mr. Johnson,
is simply incorrect factually. Since there was no legal basis for the introduction of the
evidence, the error was an abuse of discretion, and for the reasons stated, inherently
prejudicial.
CONCLUSION

Under the objective standards set forth in Strickland, there was ineffective
assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct and abuse of discretion by the Court. In
light of the overall weakness of appellee's case, the prejudicial effect of these errors is
apparent. Consequently the verdict must be vacated in the name of justice, compassion
and reason, and Mr. Johnson should be afforded a new trial.
y submitted,
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DECLARATION OF ELIZABETH A. JOHNSON
2

3
4
5

6

I, Elizabeth A. Johnson do hereby declare and S\\ear as follows:

1. I received a B.S. degree in chemistry in 1982 from Wofford College in Spartanburg, SC
and a Ph.D. degree in immunology in 1987 from the Medical University of South
Carolina. My formal education also includes four years of post-doctoral training in the

7
8

field of molecular biology and DNA analysis at the Medical University of SC and at MD

9

Anderson Cancer Center in Houston, Texas.
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2. I have been a forensic scientist for fourteen years. I was hired to establish the DNA

11

12

laboratory within the Harris County Medical Examiners Office in Houston, Texas in
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1991, and I was the director of that laboratory. I also assumed supervision of their
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serology laboratory in 1996. I personally implemented and validated both RFLP-
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17
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( chemiluminescent detection) and PCR-based DNA analysis in this laboratory. I was a
Senior Forensic Scientist at Technical Associates, Inc., Ventura, California from
February 1997 until May 2003 and performed and supervised both RFLP and PCR-base

19
20
21
22

testing including DQA 1, Polymarker, D 1S80 and various STR multiplex systems. I
have performed evidence examinations in hundreds of cases and performed DNA
analyses on several thousand samples. I am currently in private practice performing

23
24
25
26

forensic science consultation.
3. I co-developed the multiplex system that allows the co-amplification of the Amelogenin
gene in a single reaction with the six Polymarker loci, and I have performed validation

27
28

on this multiplex system and that the manuscript describing this technique and its

I

validation has been published by the peer reviewed Journal of Forensic Sciences,

2

January, 1997. I have experience with the area of developmental research and validation

3

4

of PCR based forensic DNA test systems because of this work. In addition to this, I

5

have presented numerous papers and posters at scientific meetings dealing with many of

6

the techniques developed by the laboratories with which I have been employed. I also
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8

9
10

11
12

have numerous publications in the area of medical research. I regularly attend forensic
science meetings and stay abreast of the current literature in this field. I am a member o
the American Academy of Forensic Sciences and the Association of Forensic DNA
Analysts and Administrators, and I hold a Certification of Qualification as a Laboratory
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Director in Forensic Identity by the State of New York (issued 8/12/02 and expires

14

8/12/06). I have been an invited speaker at universities and colleges, professional Bar
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Associations and legal conferences to speak on various issues of DNA analysis, evidence

16
17
18
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examination, and crime laboratories.

4. I am a court qualified expert in the field of Criminalistics and DNA analysis, and I have
been appointed by courts of various jurisdictions in California and other states to consult
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on and/or perform PCR- and RFLP-based DNA typing in numerous criminal cases and
have testified as an expert on both PCR- and RFLP-based DNA analysis for both the
defense and prosecution many times.
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5. I was retained by attorney John O'Connell, Jr. in the case of People v. Terry Johnson to

26

review and advise on forensic biology and DNA matters prior to the defendant's trial. I
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have now been contacted by attorney Theodore W eckel in the appellate matter of this

28
2

case. I have reviewed discovery which initially included offense reports as well as

2

laboratory notes and reports from the Utah Crime Laboratory and a report from

3

4

Serological Research Institute (SERI). I have recently reviewed trial transcripts pages

5

405-442 which include the direct and cross examination testimony of the State's

6

scientific expert, Gabriel Bier, and pages 489-495 of Mr. O'Connell's closing remarks.

7
6. In my opinion several subjects were not adequately explained to the jury by the State's

8
9
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witness, and the lack of adequate explanation could have negatively affected Mr.
Johnson's case.
7. The relevance of lightness of the bloodstains on the baby blanket as well as the lack of

12
13

blood on the defendant's clothing was not adequately explained. In a case such as this

14

that involves multiple stab wounds and a large amount of blood at the scene on the

15

carpet, it is reasonable to expect to find some blood on the clothing or shoes of the

16
17

18
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perpetrator and none was detected by the criminalist. This latter point was not clarified
at trial. Furthermore, the fact that two apparent bloodstains stains on the baby blanket
were very light is extremely significant. This could be consistent with older stains that

20
21

22
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had been washed since being deposited as opposed to being fresh transfer or direct
deposit stains.
8. Also, the fact that the DNA from one apparent bloodstain stain on the blanket was very

24
25

26
27

minimal in quantity, degraded, and produced a partial DNA profile and that no DNA wa
detected from another stain is significant but was not adequately explained to the jury.
A very small, fresh bloodstain contains ample DNA to obtain a complete profile since

28

3

1
2

PCR testing (the method used by Mr. Bier in this case) is extremely sensitive. If

biological stains are stored under proper laboratory condxtions, the DNA contained

3
4

within even a small bloodstain can remain non-degraded for many years and a complete

5

DNA profile can be obtained from such a sample. Biological material that has been

6

subjected to any of a variety of insults such as sunlight, dirt, chemicals, and bacteria

7
8

which grow under moist conditions will suffer from degradation to varying degrees. In

9

this process, the DNA within the cells in the stain (blood, saliva, tissue, etc.) will begin

10

to breakdown into smaller and smaller pieces. Because of degradation the DNA strands

11

can break down so completely that no DNA test results may be obtained from even a
12
13

large visible stain. Alternatively, degradation can result in a partial break down of the

14

DNA strands so that some of the smaller sections of DNA can still be typed and a partial

15

DNA profile may be obtained. Forensic laboratories today typically test using short

16
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tandem repeats (STRs) and test DNA at 9 or 13 locations (loci) along the DNA strand.
In this case, Mr. Bier tested two stains from the baby blank,et at 13 loci. On stain Q I Mr.
Bier obtained extremely weak results at only 5 loci and no results at the remaining loci.
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The results on Q I are consistent with both a very minimal stain containing very little
biological material as well as with the DNA being degraded. Such a stain could have
been present on the blanket for some time and undergone de:gradation, and it may have
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been washed which would contribute to the loss of biological material as well as to

26

degradation. Mr. Bier obtained no results at all on stain Q2 which was also very light.

27

The victim had routine contact with the child and had contact with the baby blanket on

28

4

the day of his death and possibly on prior occasions. It was not adequately explained to

2

the jury that it would not be unexpected to find a small amount of the victim's blood or

3
some other of his DNA-containing t1uids on the blanket, and that DNA testing does not
4

5

reveal how or when a stain was deposited.

6 9. Another topic that was not adequately explained is that of contamination. Samples of
7
very low DNA quantity and quality such as Q 1 are easily contaminated with more

8
9

concentrated sources ofDNA. Contamination can occur in the laboratory if reference

10

samples (such as the known sample from the victim or defendant) or other sources of

11

high quantity DNA are inadvertently introduced into the compromised sample. Extreme

12
13

care and caution must be used in the handling of minimal samples in order to avoid

14

contamination since PCR testing is capable of detecting DNA from just a few cells.

15

Contamination can also occur during the collection of evidence if a person carelessly

16
17

handles one item containing a bloodstain, for example, and then handles another item

18

without changing gloves or instruments. In this case Mr. Bier processed the victim's

19

reference sample in the same quantification, amplification, and detection runs as the Q 1

20
21
22
23

and Q2 stains from the baby blanket. Although from his lab notes Mr. Bier appears to
have taken some precautions to avoid cross contamination, contamination of the blanket
sample with a small amount ofDNA from the victim's reference sample could have

24
25

occurred if he had not changed his gloves or exercised extreme care in working with the

26

two types of samples together. Detection of this type of error would usually not be

27

possible through a review oflab notes either by an internal or external reviewer if the

28

5

r

contamination involved a sample and not a blank.
2

10. Also, Mr. Bier did not analyze substrate controls with the samples from the baby blanket

3
4

and the importance of this topic was not adequately explained. With an apparent

5

bloodstain on fabric, an analyst would collect a portion of the apparent bloodstain for

6

DNA testing. In addition, the analyst should collect and

st:~parately

test a similar sized

7
8
9
10

portion of unstained fabric that is taken as close to the visible stain as possible, and this
latter sample is called a "substrate control". Saliva, tears, nasal fluid, vaginal secretions
are all examples of biological sources of cells that contain DNA but which usually do

11
not produce a visible stain. If cells from one or more of these fluids are superimposed
12
13

with an old bloodstain which no longer contains type-able DNA due to degradation or

14

low quantity, the DNA result that is obtained may be mistaken as originating from blood

15

when in fact it may be from one of these other fluids. If a substrate control is run as

16
17

described above and shows DNA in the background around the stain, an analyst must

18

cautiously interpret the data he or she gets from the apparent bloodstained area. It may

19

not be possible to tell if the source of a DNA profile, even it is from one individual, is

20
21
22

23

from blood, saliva or both if additional testing is not performed. A DNA profile cannot
be absolutely attributed to a bloodstain if a substrate control is not tested. Mr. Bier
incorrectly stated (p 4 3 3) that testing a substrate control is only used to reconcile

24
25

problems as with mixtures. Assisting with mixture interpretation is not the only use for

26

substrate control, and it overlooks its primary value, that is, to assist an analyst in

27

knowing what type of cellular material a DNA profile may or may not be from. In this

28

6

case Mr. Bier did not run substrate controls when he tested the light apparent bloodstains

2

on the baby blanket, however, SERI did so in 1994 when they tested stains from two

3
4

blankets using a different type of PCR testing. The results from SERI show that there

5

was a low level of DNA in the substrate controls taken from both blankets, but because

6

the test kits they used were different from those used by Mr. Bier in 2002 the data from

7

8
9
10

the two labs cannot be directly compared.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that those
matters stated upon information and belief are true to the best of my knowledge.

11

Executed on this 22nd day ofNovember 2005, at Ventura County, California.
12

13
14

15

. Johnson, Ph.D.

16
17

18
19
20
21

22

23
24
25

26
27

28
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

-vsTERRY LOUIS JOHNSON,

Case No. 02J-901094FS
(ba_ v

ve ++

Defendant.

The State, by and through it's attorneys, Katie Bernards-Goodman and Fred
Burmester, Deputy District Attorneys, herein submit it's Findings of Facts, Conclusion
of Law and Order regarding Defendant's Motion For a New Trial.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On December 30, 1993 Christopher Mosier, a 14 year old child, was
babysitting Defendant Terry Louis Johnson's baby at the Mosier's home at
4525 South 1175 West #83 in Salt Lake County. Christopher's mother had
been scheduled to tend the baby, however, she had been called in to work and
had left the baby with Christopher.

2.

At 7:30p.m. on December 30, 1993, Christopher's grandmother, Gladys
Mosier, called Christopher to make sure everything was fine. Christopher

talked to his grandmother on the phone, letting her know that the baby was
still there, and everything was fine.
3.

Between 7:40 and 7:45p.m. (by Defendant's own admissions) Defendant
Johnson came to the Mosier residence to pick up his child.

4.

At 7:45p.m. and 8:00p.m., Christopher Mosier's mother, Sylvia Mosier,
called Christopher from her work to check on him. There was no answer.

5.

At 8:30p.m. Linda Johnson, Defendant's wife, arrived at the Mosier home to
pick up the baby. She had been scheduled to pick up the baby that evening.
Linda knocked on the door. There was no answer. She went home and began
to make calls to locate her baby.

6.

At 9:15 p.m., Sylvia Mosier retumed home to find her son, Christopher,
stabbed to death. The baby was not in the home. There was no forcible
entrance into the residence, and the only items missing were a camcorder and
a bar of soap from the bathroom.

7.

At 9:30p.m., Defendant called his wife, Linda, from a friend's home (Magde
Hassan's home), and tells Linda to come and pick up the baby. Linda
responds to Hassan's residence and picks up the baby.

8.

When Linda retums to Defendant's and her apartment, the police are waiting.
The police take the baby's clothing and blanket into evidence.

9.

Police call Defendant at Hassan's and tell him to come home to his apartment.
Defendant and Hassan arrive and are taken to the police station for
questioning.

10.

Hassan tells police that Defendant went in the bathroom of Hassan's
apartment and spent some time cleaning up when he first arrived at Hassan's.
Defendant was not wearing a coat (which Linda said he always wore).

11.

Defendant changed the baby's clothing. (The baby clothes taken into
evidence were not the clothing the baby was wearing when Sylvia left the
baby with Christopher). Defendant left a bar of soap in Hassan's bathroom

12.

Hassan further admitted that he and the Defendant used drugs that evening.
Years later, Hassan admitted he and defendant drove to the shelter so
defendant could buy more drugs that evening.

13.

Defendant tells police that he picked up his baby, everything was fine, and
then he went home and changed his clothing and went to Hassan's. Police ask
Defendant for the clothing and shoes he had been wearing earlier that evening.
He promises to turn those items in.

14.

The next morning, on December 31, 1993, Defendant returned to Hassan's
apartment. He told Hassan that he would never stab anyone 15 or 16 times
and apologized for causing Hassan to be questioned by the police.

15.

On December 31, 1993 Medical Examiner, Dr. Ed. Leis examined Christopher
Mosier's body finding he had been stabbed repeatedly. Christopher suffered
approximately 15 primary stab wounds to his abdomen, chest, and back; and
additional defensive grazing and cut wounds to his arn1s and hands. This
information was not released to the press.

16.

In the first week ofJanuary, 1994, defendant's wife, Linda Johnson, noticed
that the largest butcher knife was missing from her set of knifes. Linda had

often found items from her and Defendant's apartment missing. She knew the
defendant had a drug problem and would steal things and pawn them to
support his habit.
17.

Defendant turned in some items of clothing that had been washed. Defendant
never surrendered the boots he had been wearing that evening, or the coat he
had been wearing that evening.

18.

Over the next several months, the Defendant and Linda Johnson's relationship
deteriorated. Defendant engaged in domestic violence and threats against
Linda, where he would tell Linda he had "killed for less". In one
conversation, he told Linda he "could kill someone and walk by the police 30
seconds later and they would never know."

19.

On November 9, 2001 Detective Todd Park resubmitted evidence from this
case to the Utah State Crime Lab. Among that evidence was the baby's
clothing and blanket. Criminologist Gab Bier tested said items for DNA and
on January 15, 2002 issued a report indicating that the victim's blood had
been identified on the baby's blanket.

20.

Detective Park located Defendant Johnson and interviewed him and placed
him under arrest. Defendant admitted that he had a drug problem during the
time frame of the murder.

21.

While Defendant was incarcerated in the Salt Lake County Detention Center
awaiting trial, he was housed with Matthew Rushton. Defendant offered Mr.
Rushton $100,000.00 if he would tell police that he knew of someone else
who had broken into the Mosier's apartment and killed Christopher and stolen

the camcorder. Defendant provided details for Rushton such as how the
victim answered the door and how much blood should be at the scene, on his
baby's blanket, and on the soap.
22.

On June 22, 2004 Defendant came before a jury trial in Judge William W.
Barrett's court. On June 24, 2004, the jury found Defendant guilty as
charged.

23.

Defendant filed a Motion for a New Trial claiming that the trial court erred by
allowing evidence of Defendant's prior bad acts in violation of rules 404(b)
and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence; that the prosecutor violated Rule
17(g)(7) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure by engaging in improper
rebuttal; that the prosecutor violated Rule 3.4(e) ofthe Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct by discussing matters not in evidence and arguing a
lower standard of proof; and ineffective assistance of counsel because defense
counsel did not call rebuttal witnesses, present a DNA expert, present an
alternative motive or make proper objections.

24.

On November 17, 2004, Judge Barrett ruled based on the following:

CONCLUSION OF LAW
1. Defendant's prior drug activities were properly admitted under Utah Rules of
Evidence 402, 403 and 404. Defendant's drug habit was the motive for this
offense. No other way was available to the State to show this motive than through
Defendant's ex-wife's testimony of Defendant's thefts to support his habit.
Specific incidences of domestic violence were elicited as foundation for

Defendant's statements, (in response to defense's foundation objections at a
pretrial motion. These incidences also explained Defendant's ex-wife's
reluctance to initially reveal infom1ation against the Defendant. These issues
were briefed and argued in pre-trial motions.
2. The prosecutor did not engage in improper rebuttal. A prosecutor's tactic of
giving a brief summation in closing and reserving the majority of his time for
rebuttal is not improper. All ofthe prosecution's comments, made in rebuttal,
were in direct response to Defendant's closing and were properly made.
3. The prosecutor did not violate Rule 3.4(e) of the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct by discussing matters not in evidence and arguing a lower standard of
proof. The prosecutor referenced a picture that had been previously admitted and
was relevant. Further, the prosecution properly argued the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
4. Defense counsel's performance was not ineffective. Defense counsel did present
alternative motives for the crime, did have an independent DNA expert examine
the State's results, and presented rebuttal witnesses that were available. Defense
counsel made proper objections in pretrial hearings as well as at the trial. There is
no evidence to support a claim that counsel's performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness or that the defendant was prejudiced.

ORDER
Based on the foregoing, Defendant's Motion For A New Trial is denied.

6

Dated

this~

day o:_;f!;,2005.
BY THE COURT:

Tlmd District Court,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the~ day of January, 2005, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER were
delivered to the following:
John O'Connell
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Robert K. Heineman
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Julie George
29 South State Street, Suite #7
P.O. Box 112338
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0338
Jeanne B. Inouye
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 61h Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

(Judge will sign in five days if no one objects)

